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In the same way as the Hilbert Program was a response to the foundational crisis of mathematics [1], this
article tries to formulate a research program for the socio-economic sciences. The aim of this contribution
is to stimulate research in order to close serious knowledge gaps in mainstream economics that the recent
financial and economic crisis has revealed. By identifying weak points of conventional approaches in economics,
we identify the scientific problems which need to be addressed. We expect that solving these questions will
bring scientists in a position to give better decision support and policy advice. We also indicate, what kinds
of insights can be contributed by scientists from other research fields such as physics, biology, computer and
social science. In order to make a quick progress and gain a systemic understanding of the whole interconnected
socio-economic-environmental system, using the data, information and computer systems available today and
in the near future, we suggest a multi-disciplinary collaboration as most promising research approach.
PACS numbers:
I. INTRODUCTION
“How did economists get it so wrong?”. Facing the financial
crisis, this question was brilliantly articulated by the Nobel
prize winner of 2008, Paul Krugman, in the New York Times
[2]. A number of prominent economists even sees a failure of
academic economics [3]. Remarkably, the following declara-
tion has been signed by more than 2000 scientists [4]: “Few
economists saw our current crisis coming, but this predictive
failure was the least of the field’s problems. More important
was the profession’s blindness to the very possibility of catas-
trophic failures in a market economy ... the economics pro-
fession went astray because economists, as a group, mistook
beauty, clad in impressive-looking mathematics, for truth ...
economists fell back in love with the old, idealized vision of
an economy in which rational individuals interact in perfect
markets, this time gussied up with fancy equations ... Unfortu-
nately, this romanticized and sanitized vision of the economy
led most economists to ignore all the things that can go wrong.
They turned a blind eye to the limitations of human rational-
ity that often lead to bubbles and busts; to the problems of
institutions that run amok; to the imperfections of markets—
especially financial markets—that can cause the economy’s
operating system to undergo sudden, unpredictable crashes;
and to the dangers created when regulators don’t believe in
regulation. ... When it comes to the all-too-human problem of
recessions and depressions, economists need to abandon the
neat but wrong solution of assuming that everyone is rational
and markets work perfectly.”
Apparently, it has not always been like this. DeLisle Wor-
rell writes: “Back in the sixties ... we were all too aware of the
limitations of the discipline: it was static where the world was
dynamic, it assumed competitive markets where few existed,
it assumed rationality when we knew full well that economic
agents were not rational ... economics had no way of deal-
ing with changing tastes and technology ... Econometrics was
equally plagued with intractable problems: economic observa-
tions are never randomly drawn and seldom independent, the
number of excluded variables is always unmanageably large,
the degrees of freedom unacceptably small, the stability of
significance tests seldom unequivocably established, the er-
rors in measurement too large to yield meaningful results ...”
[5].
In the following, we will try to identify the scientific chal-
lenges that must be addressed to come up with better theories
in the near future. This comprises practical challenges, i.e. the
real-life problems that must be faced (see Sec. II), and funda-
mental challenges, i.e. the methodological advances that are
required to solve these problems (see Sec. III). After this, we
will discuss, which contribution can be made by related scien-
tific disciplines such as econophysics and the social sciences.
The intention of this contribution is constructive. It tries to
stimulate a fruitful scientific exchange, in order to find the
best way out of the crisis. According to our perception, the
economic challenges we are currently facing can only be mas-
tered by large-scale, multi-disciplinary efforts and by innova-
tive approaches [6]. We fully recognize the large variety of
non-mainstream approaches that has been developed by “het-
erodox economists”. However, the research traditions in eco-
nomics seem to be so powerful that these are not paid much
attention to. Besides, there is no agreement on which of the al-
ternative modeling approaches would be the most promising
ones, i.e. the heterogeneity of alternatives is one of the prob-
lems, which slows down their success. This situation clearly
implies institutional challenges as well, but these go beyond
the scope of this contribution and will therefore be addressed
in the future.
II. REAL-WORLD CHALLENGES
Since decades, if not since hundreds of years, the world is
facing a number of recurrent socio-economic problems, which
are obviously hard to solve. Before addressing related fun-
damental scientific challenges in economics, we will there-
fore point out practical challenges one needs to pay attention
to. This basically requires to classify the multitude of prob-
lems into packages of interrelated problems. Probably, such
2classification attempts are subjective to a certain extent. At
least, the list presented below differs from the one elaborated
by Lomborg et al. [7], who identified the following top ten
problems: air pollution, security/conflict, disease control, edu-
cation, climate change, hunger/malnutrition, water sanitation,
barriers to migration and trade, transnational terrorism and, fi-
nally, women and development. The following (non-ranked)
list, in contrast, is more focused on socio-economic factors
rather than resource and engineering issues, and it is more ori-
ented at the roots of problems rather than their symptoms:
1. Demographic change of the population structure
(change of birth rate, migration, integration...)
2. Financial and economic (in)stability (government
debts, taxation, and inflation/deflation; sustainability of
social benefit systems; consumption and investment be-
havior...)
3. Social, economic and political participation and inclu-
sion (of people of different gender, age, health, educa-
tion, income, religion, culture, language, preferences;
reduction of unemployment...)
4. Balance of power in a multi-polar world (between dif-
ferent countries and economic centers; also between in-
dividual and collective rights, political and company
power; avoidance of monopolies; formation of coali-
tions; protection of pluralism, individual freedoms, mi-
norities...)
5. Collective social behavior and opinion dynamics
(abrupt changes in consumer behavior; social conta-
gion, extremism, hooliganism, changing values; break-
down of cooperation, trust, compliance, solidarity...)
6. Security and peace (organized crime, terrorism, social
unrest, independence movements, conflict, war...)
7. Institutional design (intellectual property rights; over-
regulation; corruption; balance between global and lo-
cal, central and decentral control...)
8. Sustainable use of resources and environment (con-
sumption habits, travel behavior, sustainable and effi-
cient use of energy and other resources, participation in
recycling efforts, environmental protection...)
9. Information management (cyber risks, misuse of sensi-
tive data, espionage, violation of privacy; data deluge,
spam; education and inheritance of culture...)
10. Public health (food safety; spreading of epidemics [flu,
SARS, H1N1, HIV], obesity, smoking, or unhealthy di-
ets...)
Some of these challenges are interdependent.
III. FUNDAMENTAL CHALLENGES
In the following, we will try to identify the fundamental
theoretical challenges that need to be addressed in order to
understand the above practical problems and to draw conclu-
sions regarding possible solutions.
The most difficult part of scientific research is often not to
find the right answer. The problem is to ask the right questions.
In this context it can be a problem that people are trained to
think in certain ways. It is not easy to leave these ways and see
the problem from a new angle, thereby revealing a previously
unnoticed solution. Three factors contribute to this:
1. We may overlook the relevant facts because we have not
learned to see them, i.e. we do not pay attention to them.
The issue is known from internalized norms, which pre-
vent people from considering possible alternatives.
2. We know the stylized facts, but may not have the right
tools at hand to interpret them. It is often difficult to
make sense of patterns detected in data. Turning data
into knowledge is quite challenging.
3. We know the stylized facts and can interpret them, but
may not take them seriously enough, as we underesti-
mate their implications. This may result from misjudge-
ments or from herding effects, i.e. from a tendency to
follow traditions and majority opinions. In fact, most
of the issues discussed below have been pointed out
before, but it seems that this did not have an effect
on mainstream economics so far or on what decision-
makers know about economics. This is probably be-
cause mainstream theory has become a norm [8], and
alternative approaches are sanctioned as norm-deviant
behavior [9, 10].
As we will try to explain, the following fundamental issues
are not just a matter of approximations (which often lead to the
right understanding, but wrong numbers). Rather they concern
fundamental errors in the sense that certain conclusions fol-
lowing from them are seriously misleading. As the recent fi-
nancial crisis has demonstrated, such errors can be very costly.
However, it is not trivial to see what dramatic consequences
factors such as dynamics, spatial interactions, randomness,
non-linearity, network effects, differentiation and heterogene-
ity, irreversibility or irrationality can have.
A. Homo economicus
Despite of criticisms by several nobel prize winners such
as Reinhard Selten (1994), Joseph Stiglitz and George Ak-
erlof (2001), or Daniel Kahneman (2002), the paradigm of
the homo economicus, i.e. of the “perfect egoist”, is still the
dominating approach in economics. It assumes that people
would have quasi-infinite memory and processing capacities
and would determine the best one among all possible alter-
native behaviors by strategic thinking (systematic utility opti-
mization), and would implement it into practice without mis-
takes. The Nobel prize winner of 1976, Milton Friedman,
3supported the hypothesis of homo economicus by the follow-
ing argument: “irrational agents will lose money and will be
driven out of the market by rational agents” [11]. More re-
cently, Robert E. Lucas Jr., the Nobel prize winner of 1995,
used the rationality hypothesis to narrow down the class of
empirically relevant equilibria [12].
The rational agent hypothesis is very charming, as its impli-
cations are clear and it is possible to derive beautiful and pow-
erful economic theorems and theories from it. The best way to
illustrate homo economicus is maybe a company that is run by
using optimization methods from operation research, apply-
ing supercomputers. Another example are professional chess
players, who are trying to anticipate the possible future moves
of their opponents. Obviously, in both examples, the future
course of actions can not be fully predicted, even if there are
no random effects and mistakes.
It is, therefore, no wonder that people have repeatedly ex-
pressed doubts regarding the realism of the rational agent
approach [13, 14]. Bertrand Russell, for example, claimed:
“Most people would rather die than think”. While this seems
to be a rather extreme opinion, the following scientific argu-
ments must be taken seriously:
1. Human cognitive capacities are bounded [16, 17]. Al-
ready phone calls or conversations can reduce people’s
attention to events in the environment a lot. Also, the
abilities to memorize facts and to perform complicated
logical analyses are clearly limited.
2. In case of NP-hard optimization problems, even super-
computers are facing limits, i.e. optimization jobs can-
not be performed in real-time anymore. Therefore, ap-
proximations or simplifications such as the application
of heuristics may be necessary. In fact, psychologists
have identified a number of heuristics, which people use
when making decisions [18].
3. People perform strategic thinking mainly in important
new situations. In normal, everyday situation, however,
they seem to pursue a satisficing rather than optimizing
strategy [17]. Meeting a certain aspiration level rather
than finding the optimal strategy can save time and en-
ergy spent on problem solving. In many situation, peo-
ple even seem to perform routine choices [14], for ex-
ample, when evading other pedestrians in counterflows.
4. There is a long list of cognitive biases which ques-
tion rational behavior [19]. For example, individuals
are favorable of taking small risks (which are pre-
ceived as “chances”, as the participation in lotteries
shows), but they avoid large risks [20]. Furthermore,
non-exponential temporal discounting may lead to para-
doxical behaviors [21] and requires one to rethink, how
future expectations must be modeled.
5. Most individuals have a tendency towards other-
regarding behavior and fairness [22, 23]. For example,
the dictator game [24] and other experiments [25] show
that people tend to share, even if there is no reason for
this. Leaving a tip for the waiter in a restaurant that
people visit only once is a typical example (particu-
larly in countries where tipping is not common) [26].
Such behavior has often been interpreted as sign of so-
cial norms. While social norms can certainly change the
payoff structure, it has been found that the overall pay-
offs resulting from them do not need to create a user or
system optimum [27–29]. This suggests that behavioral
choices may be irrational in the sense of non-optimal. A
typical example is the existence of unfavorable norms,
which are supported by people although nobody likes
them [30].
6. Certain optimization problems can have an infinite
number of local optima or Nash equilibria, which makes
it impossible to decide what is the best strategy [31].
7. Convergence towards the optimal solution may require
such a huge amount of time that the folk theorem be-
comes useless. This can make it practically impossible
to play the best response strategy [32].
8. The optimal strategy may be deterministically chaotic,
i.e. sensitive to arbitrarily small details of the initial
condition, which makes the dynamic solution unpre-
dictable on the long run (“butterfly effect”) [33, 34].
This fundamental limit of predictability also implies a
limit of control—two circumstances that are even more
true for non-deterministic systems with a certain degree
of randomness.
In conclusion, although the rational agent paradigm (the
paradigm of homo economicus) is theoretically powerful and
appealing, there are a number of empirical and theoretical
facts, which suggest deficiencies. In fact, most methods used
in financial trading (such as technical analysis) are not well
compatible with the rational agent approach. Even if an op-
timal solution exists, it may be undecidable for practical rea-
sons or for theoretical ones [35, 36]. This is also relevant for
the following challenges, as boundedly rational agents may
react inefficently and with delays, which questions the effi-
cient market hypothesis, the equilibrium paradigm, and other
fundamental concepts, calling for the consideration of spatial,
network, and time-dependencies, heterogeneity and correla-
tions etc. It will be shown that these points can have dramatic
implications regarding the predictions of economic models.
B. The efficient market hypothesis
The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) was first developed
by Eugene Fama [37] in his Ph.D. thesis and rapidly spread
among leading economists, who used it as an argument to pro-
mote laissez-faire policies. The EMH states that current prices
reflect all publicly available information and (in its stronger
formulation) that prices instantly change to reflect new public
information.
The idea of self-regulating markets goes back to Adam
Smith [38], who believed that “the free market, while appear-
ing chaotic and unrestrained, is actually guided to produce the
4right amount and variety of goods by a so-called ‘invisible
hand’.” Furthermore, “by pursuing his own interest, [the indi-
vidual] frequently promotes that of the society more effectu-
ally than when he intends to promote it” [39]. For this reason,
Adam Smith is often considered to be the father of free mar-
ket economics. Curiously enough, however, he also wrote a
book on “The Theory of Moral Sentiments” [40]. “His goal
in writing the work was to explain the source of mankind’s
ability to form moral judgements, in spite of man’s natural
inclinations towards self-interest. Smith proposes a theory of
sympathy, in which the act of observing others makes people
aware of themselves and the morality of their own behavior...
[and] seek the approval of the ‘impartial spectator’ as a re-
sult of a natural desire to have outside observers sympathize
with them” [38]. Such a reputation-based concept would be
considered today as indirect reciprocity [41].
Of course, there are criticisms of the efficient market hy-
pothesis [42], and the Nobel prize winner of 2001, Joseph
Stiglitz, even believes that “There is not invisible hand” [43].
The following list gives a number of empirical and theoretical
arguments questioning the efficient market hypothesis:
1. Examples of market failures are well-known and can re-
sult, for example, in cases of monopolies or oligopolies,
if there is not enough liquidity or if information symme-
try is not given.
2. While the concept of the “invisible hand” assumes
something like an optimal self-organization [44], it is
well-known that this requires certain conditions, such
as symmetrical interactions. In general, however, self-
organization does not necessarily imply system-optimal
solutions. Stop-and-go traffic [45] or crowd disasters
[46] are two obvious examples for systems, in which
individuals competitively try to reach individually op-
timal outcomes, but where the optimal solution is dy-
namically unstable.
3. The limited processing capacity of boundedly rational
individuals implies potential delays in their responses
to sensorial inputs, which can cause such instabilities
[47]. For example, a delayed adaptation in production
systems may contribute to the occurrence of business
cycles [48]. The same applies to the labor market of spe-
cially skilled people, which cannot adjust on short time
scales. Even without delayed reactions, however, the
competitive optimization of individuals can lead to sub-
optimal individual results, as the “tragedy of the com-
mons” in public goods dilemmas demonstrates [49, 50].
4. Bubbles and crashes, or more generally, extreme events
in financial markets should not occur, if the efficient
market hypothesis was correct (see next subsection).
5. Collective social behavior such as “herding effects” as
well as deviations of human behavior from what is ex-
pected from rational agents can lead to such bubbles and
crashes [51], or can further increase their size through
feedback effects [52]. Cyclical feedbacks leading to os-
cillations are also known from the beer game [53] or
from business cycles [48].
C. Equilibrium paradigm
The efficient market paradigm implies the equilibrium
paradigm. This becomes clear, if we split it up into its un-
derlying hypotheses:
1. The market can be in equilibrium, i.e. there exists an
equilibrium.
2. There is one and only one equilibrium.
3. The equilibrium is stable, i.e. any deviations from the
equilibrium due to “fluctuations” or “perturbations”
tend to disappear eventually.
4. The relaxation to the equilibrium occurs at an infinite
rate.
Note that, in order to act like an “invisible hand”, the stable
equilibrium (Nash equilibrium) furthermore needs to be a sys-
tem optimum, i.e. to maximize the average utility. This is true
for coordination games, when interactions are well-mixed and
exploration behavior as well as transaction costs can be ne-
glected [54]. However, it is not fulfilled by so-called social
dilemmas [49].
Let us discuss the evidence for the validity of the above
hypotheses one by one:
1. A market is a system of extremely many dynami-
cally coupled variables. Theoretically, it is not obvious
that such a system would have a stationary solution.
For example, the system could behave periodic, quasi-
periodic, chaotic, or turbulent [81–83, 85–87, 94]. In all
these cases, there would be no convergence to a station-
ary solution.
2. If a stationary solution exists, it is not clear that there
are no further stationary solutions. If many variables
are non-linearly coupled, the phenomenon of multi-
stability can easily occur [55]. That is, the solution to
which the system converges may not only depend on
the model parameters, but also on the initial condition,
history, or perturbation size. Such facts are known as
path-dependencies or hysteresis effects and are usually
visualized by so-called phase diagrams [56].
3. In systems of non-linearly interacting variables, the ex-
istence of a stationary solution does not necessarily im-
ply that it is stable, i.e. that the system will converge to
this solution. For example, the stationary solution could
be a focal point with orbiting solutions (as for the classi-
cal Lotka-Volterra equations [57]), or it could be unsta-
ble and give rise to a limit cycle [58] or a chaotic solu-
tion [33], for example (see also item 1). In fact, experi-
mental results suggest that volatility clusters in financial
markets may be a result of over-reactions to deviations
from the fundamental value [59].
4. An infinite relaxation rate is rather unusual, as most de-
cisions and related implemenations take time [15, 60].
5The points listed in the beginning of this subsection are also
questioned by empirical evidence. In this connection, one may
mention the existence of business cycles [48] or unstable or-
ders and deliveries observed in the experimental beer game
[53]. Moreover, bubbles and crashes have been found in fi-
nancial market games [61]. Today, there seems to be more
evidence against than for the equilibrium paradigm.
In the past, however, most economists assumed that bub-
bles and crashes would not exist (and many of them still do).
The following quotes are quite typical for this kind of think-
ing (from [62]): In 2004, the Federal Reserve chairman of the
U.S., Alan Greenspan, stated that the rise in house values was
“not enough in our judgment to raise major concerns”. In July
2005 when asked about the possibility of a housing bubble and
the potential for this to lead to a recession in the future, the
present U.S. Federal Reserve chairman Ben Bernanke (then
Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors) said: “It’s a
pretty unlikely possibility. We’ve never had a decline in hous-
ing prices on a nationwide basis. So, what I think is more
likely is that house prices will slow, maybe stabilize, might
slow consumption spending a bit. I don’t think it’s going to
drive the economy too far from it’s full path though.” As late
as May 2007 Bernanke stated that the Federal Reserve “do not
expect significant spillovers from the subprime market to the
rest of the economy”.
According to the classical interpretation, sudden changes
in stock prices result from new information, e.g. from innova-
tions (“technological shocks”). The dynamics in such systems
has, for example, been described by the method of compar-
ative statics (i.e. a series of snapshots). Here, the system is
assumed to be in equilibrium in each moment, but the equilib-
rium changes adiabatically (i.e. without delay), as the system
parameters change (e.g. through new facts). Such a treatment
of system dynamics, however, has certain deficiencies:
1. The approach cannot explain changes in or of the sys-
tem, such as phase transitions (“systemic shifts”), when
the system is at a critical point (“tipping point”).
2. It does not allow one to understand innovations and
other changes as results of an endogeneous system dy-
namics.
3. It cannot describe effects of delays or instabilities,
such as overshooting, self-organization, emergence,
systemic breakdowns or extreme events (see Sec. III D).
4. It does not allow one to study effects of different time
scales. For example, when there are fast autocatalytic
(self-reinfocing) effects and slow inhibitory effects, this
may lead to pattern formation phenomena in space and
time [63, 64]. The formation of settlements, where peo-
ple agglomerate in space, may serve as an example
[65, 66].
5. It ignores long-term correlations such as memory ef-
fects.
6. It neglects frictional effects, which are often propor-
tional to change (“speed”) and occur in most complex
systems. Without friction, however, it is difficult to un-
derstand entropy and other path-dependent effects, in
particular irreversibility (i.e. the fact that the system
may not be able to get back to the previous state) [67].
For example, the unemployment rate has the property
that it does not go back to the previous level in most
countries after a business cycle [68].
D. Prevalence of linear models
Comparative statics is, of course, not the only method used
in economics to describe the dynamics of the system under
consideration. As in physics and other fields, one may use a
linear approximation around a stationary solution to study the
response of the system to fluctuations or perturbations [69].
Such a linear stability analysis allows one to study, whether
the system will return to the stationary solution (which is the
case for a stable [Nash] equilibrium) or not (which implies
that the system will eventually be driven into a new state or
regime).
In fact, the great majority of statistical analyses use linear
models to fit empirical data (also when they do not involve
time-dependencies). It is know, however, that linear models
have special features, which are not representative for the rich
variety of possible functional dependencies, dynamics, and
outcomes. Therefore, the neglection of non-linearity has se-
rious consequences:
1. As it was mentioned before, phenomena like multiple
equilibria, chaos or turbulence cannot be understood by
linear models. The same is true for self-organization
phenomena or emergence. Additionally, in non-linearly
coupled systems, usually “more is different”, i.e. the
system may change its behavior fundamentally as it
grows beyond a certain size. Furthermore, the system
is often hard to predict and difficult to control (see Sec.
III H).
2. Linear modeling tends to overlook that a strong cou-
pling of variables, which would show a normally dis-
tributed behavior in separation, often leads to fat tail
distributions (such as “power laws”) [70, 71]. This im-
plies that extreme events are much more frequent than
expected according to a Gaussian distribution. For ex-
ample, when additive noise is replaced by multiplicative
noise, a number of surprising phenomena may result,
including noise-induced transitions [72] or directed ran-
dom walks (“ratchet effects”) [73].
3. Phenomena such as catastrophes [74] or phase transi-
tion (“system shifts”) [75] cannot be well understood
within a linear modeling framework. The same applies
to the phenomenon of “self-organized criticality” [79]
(where the system drives itself to a critical state, typ-
ically with power-law characteristics) or cascading ef-
fects, which can result from network interactions (over-
critically challenged network nodes or links) [77, 78].
It should be added that the relevance of network ef-
fects resulting from the on-going globalization is often
6underestimated. For example, “the stock market crash
of 1987, began with a small drop in prices which trig-
gered an avalanche of sell orders in computerized trad-
ing programs, causing a further price decline that trig-
gered more automatic sales.” [80]
Therefore, while linear models have the advantage of being
analytically solvable, they are often unrealistic. Studying non-
linear behavior, in contrast, often requires numerical compu-
tational approaches. It is likely that most of today’s unsolved
economic puzzles cannot be well understood through linear
models, no matter how complicated they may be (in terms of
the number of variables and parameters) [81–94]. The follow-
ing list mentions some areas, where the importance of non-
linear interdependencies is most likely underestimated:
• collective opinions, such as trends, fashions, or herding
effects,
• the success of new (and old) technologies, products,
etc.,
• cultural or opinion shifts, e.g. regarding nuclear power,
genetically manipulated food, etc.,
• the “fitness” or competitiveness of a product, value,
quality perceptions, etc.,
• the respect for copyrights,
• social capital (trust, cooperation, compliance, solidar-
ity, ...),
• booms and recessions, bubbles and crashes,
• bank panics,
• community, cluster, or group formation.
• relationships between different countries, including war
(or trade war) and peace.
E. Representative agent approach
Another common simplification in economic modeling is
the representative agent approach, which is known in physics
as mean field approximation. Within this framework, time-
dependencies and non-linear dependencies are often consid-
ered, but it is assumed that the interaction with other agents
(e.g. of one company with all the other companies) can be
treated as if this agent would interact with an average agent,
the “representative agent”.
Let us illustrate this with the example of the public goods
dilemma. Here, everyone can decide whether to make an in-
dividual contribution to the public good or not. The sum of
all contributions is multiplied by a synergy factor, reflecting
the benefit of cooperation, and the resulting value is equally
shared among all people. The prediction of the representa-
tive agent approach is that, due to the selfishness of agents,
a “tragedy of the commons” would result [49]. According to
this, everybody should free-ride, i.e. nobody should make a
contribution to the public good and nobody would gain any-
thing. However, if everybody would contribute, everybody
could multiply his or her contribution by the synergy factor.
This example is particularly relevant as society is facing a
lot of public goods problems and would not work without
cooperation. Everything from the creation of public infras-
tructures (streets, theaters, universities, libraries, schools, the
World Wide Web, Wikipedia etc.) over the use of environmen-
tal resources (water, forests, air, etc.) or of social benefit sys-
tems (such as a public health insurance), maybe even the cre-
ation and maintainance of a commonly shared language and
culture are public goods problems (although the last examples
are often viewed as coordination problems). Even the process
of creating public goods is a public good [95].
While it is a well-known problem that people tend to make
unfair contributions to public goods or try to get a bigger share
of them, individuals cooperate much more than one would ex-
pect according to the representative agent approach. If they
would not, society could simply not exist. In economics, one
tries to solve the problem by introducing taxes (i.e. another in-
centive structure) or a “shadow of the future” (i.e. a strategic
optimization over infinite time horizons in accordance with
the rational agent approach) [96, 97]. Both comes down to
changing the payoff structure in a way that transforms the
public good problem into another one that does not constitute
a social dilemma [98]. However, there are other solutions of
the problem. When the realm of the mean-field approximation
underlying the representative agent approach is left and spa-
tial or network interactions or the heterogeneity among agents
are considered, a miracle occurs: Cooperation can survive or
even thrive through correlations and co-evolutionary effects
[99–101].
A similar result is found for the public goods game with
costly punishment. Here, the representative agent model pre-
dicts that individuals avoid to invest into punishment, so that
punishment efforts eventually disappear (and, as a conse-
quence, cooperation as well). However, this “second-order
free-rider problem” is naturally resolved and cooperation can
spread, if one discards the mean-field approximation and con-
siders the fact that interactions take place in space or so-
cial networks [56]. Societies can overcome the tragedy of the
commons even without transforming the incentive structure
through taxes. For example, social norms as well as group dy-
namical and reputation effects can do so [102]. The represen-
tative agent approach implies just the opposite conclusion and
cannot well explain the mechanisms on which society is built.
It is worth pointing out that the relevance of public goods
dilemmas is probably underestimated in economics. Partially
related to Adam Smith’s belief in an “invisible hand”, one
often assumes underlying coordination games and that they
would automatically create a harmony between an individ-
ually and system optimal state in the course of time [54].
However, running a stable financial system and economy is
most likely a public goods problem. Considering unemploy-
ment, recessions always go along with a breakdown of soli-
darity and cooperation. Efficient production clearly requires
mutual cooperation (as the counter-example of countries with
many strikes illustrates). The failure of the interbank market
7when banks stop lending to each other, is a good example
for the breakdown of both, trust and cooperation. We must be
aware that there are many other systems that would not work
anymore, if people would lose their trust: electronic bank-
ing, e-mail and internet use, Facebook, eBusiness and eGov-
ernance, for example. Money itself would not work without
trust, as bank panics and hyperinflation scenarios show. Sim-
ilarly, cheating customers by selling low-quality products or
selling products at overrated prices, or by manipulating their
choices by advertisements rather than informing them objec-
tively and when they want, may create profits on the short run,
but it affects the trust of customers (and their willingness to
invest). The failure of the immunization campaign during the
swine flu pandemics may serve as an example. Furthermore,
people would probably spend more money, if the products of
competing companies were better compatible with each other.
Therefore, on the long run, more cooperation among compa-
nies and with the customers would pay off and create addi-
tional value.
Besides providing a misleading picture of how cooperation
comes about, there are a number of other deficiencies of the
representative agent approach, which are listed below:
1. Correlations between variables are neglected, which is
acceptable only for “well-mixing” systems. According
to what is known from critical phenomena in physics,
this approximation is valid only, when the interactions
take place in high-dimensional spaces or if the system
elements are well connected. (However, as the example
of the public goods dilemma showed, this case does not
necessarily have beneficial consequences. Well-mixed
interactions could rather cause a breakdown of social
or economic institutions, and it is conceivable that this
played a role in the recent financial crisis.)
2. Percolation phenomena, describing how far an idea,
innovation, technology, or (computer) virus spreads
through a social or business network, are not well repro-
duced, as they depend on details of the network struc-
ture, not just on the average node degree [103].
3. The heterogeneity of agents is ignored. For this reason,
factors underlying economic exchange, perturbations,
or systemic robustness [104] cannot be well described.
Moreover, as socio-economic differentiation and spe-
cialization imply heterogeneity, they cannot be under-
stood as emergent phenomena within a representative
agent approach. Finally, it is not possible to grasp inno-
vation without the consideration of variability. In fact,
according to evolutionary theory, the innovation rate
would be zero, if the variability was zero [105]. Fur-
thermore, in order to explain innovation in modern soci-
eties, Schumpeter introduced the concept of the “polit-
ical entrepreneur” [106], an extra-ordinarily gifted per-
son capable of creating disruptive change and innova-
tion. Such an extraordinary individual can, by defini-
tion, not be modeled by a “representative agent”.
One of the most important drawbacks of the representative
agent approach is that it cannot explain the fundamental fact
of economic exchange, since it requires one to assume a het-
erogeneity in resources or production costs, or to consider a
variation in the value of goods among individuals. Ken Arrow,
Nobel prize winner in 1972, formulated this point as follows
[107]: “One of the things that microeconomics teaches you is
that individuals are not alike. There is heterogeneity, and prob-
ably the most important heterogeneity here is heterogeneity of
expectations. If we didn’t have heterogeneity, there would be
no trade.”
We close this section by mentioning that economic ap-
proaches, which go beyond the representative agent approach,
can be found in Refs. [108, 109].
F. Lack of micro-macro link and ecological systems thinking
Another deficiency of economic theory that needs to be
mentioned is the lack of a link between micro- and macroeco-
nomics. Neoclassical economics implicitly assumes that indi-
viduals make their decisions in isolation, using only the infor-
mation received from static market signals. Within this over-
simplified framework, macro-aggregates are just projections
of some representative agent behavior, instead of the outcome
of complex interactions with asymmetric information among
a myriad of heterogeneous agents.
In principle, it should be understandable how the macroe-
conomic dynamics results from the microscopic decisions and
interactions on the level of producers and consumers [81, 110]
(as it was possible in the past to derive micro-macro links for
other systems with a complex dynamical behavior such as in-
teractive vehicle traffic [111]). It should also be comprehen-
sible how the macroscopic level (the aggregate econonomic
situation) feeds back on the microscopic level (the behavior
of consumers and producers), and to understand the economy
as a complex, adaptive, self-organizing system [112, 113].
Concepts from evolutionary theory [114] and ecology [115]
appear to be particularly promising [116]. This, however, re-
quires a recognition of the importance of heterogeneity for the
system (see the the previous subsection).
The lack of ecological thinking implies not only that
the sensitive network interdependencies between the various
agents in an economic system (as well as minority solutions)
are not properly valued. It also causes deficiencies in the de-
velopment and implementation of a sustainable economic ap-
proach based on recycling and renewable resources. Today,
forestry science is probably the best developed scientific dis-
cipline concerning sustainability concepts [117]. Economic
growth to maintain social welfare is a serious misconception.
From other scientific disciplines, it is well known that stable
pattern formation is also possible for a constant (and poten-
tially sustainable) inflow of energy [69, 118].
G. Optimization of system performance
One of the great achievements of economics is that it has
developed a multitude of methods to use scarce resources ef-
ficiently. A conventional approach to this is optimization. In
8principle, there is nothing wrong about this approach. Nev-
ertheless, there are a number of problems with the way it is
usually applied.
1. One can only optimize for one goal at a time, while
usually, one needs to meet several objectives. This is
mostly addressed by weighting the different goals (ob-
jectives), by executing a hierarchy of optimization steps
(through ranking and prioritization), or by applying a
satisficing strategy (requiring a minimum performance
for each goal) [119, 120]. However, when different op-
timization goals are in conflict with each other (such as
maximizing the throughput and minimizing the queue
length in a production system), a sophisticated time-
dependent strategy may be needed [121].
2. There is no unique rule what optimization goal should
be chosen. Low costs? High profit? Best customer sat-
isfaction? Large throughput? Competitive advantage?
Resilience? [122] In fact, the choice of the optimization
function is arbitrary to a certain extent and, therefore,
the result of optimization may vary largely. Goal se-
lection requires strategic decisions, which may involve
normative or moral factors (as in politics). In fact, one
can often observe that, in the course of time, differ-
ent goal functions are chosen. Moreover, note that the
maximization of certain objectives such as resilience or
“fitness” depends not only on factors that are under the
control of a company. Resilience and “fitness” are func-
tions of the whole system, in particularly, they also de-
pend on the competitors and the strategies chosen by
them.
3. The best solution may be the combination of two bad
solutions and may, therefore, be overlooked. In other
words, there are “evolutionary dead ends”, so that grad-
ual optimization may not work. (This problem can be
partially overcome by the application of evolutionary
mechanisms [120]).
4. In certain systems (such as many transport, logistic,
or production systems), optimization tends to drive the
system towards instability, since the point of maximum
efficiency is often in the neighborhood or even identi-
cal with the point of breakdown of performance. Such
breakdowns in capacity or performance can result from
inefficiencies due to dynamic interaction effects. For
example, when traffic flow reaches its maximum capac-
ity, sooner or later it breaks down. As a consequence,
the road capacity tends to drop during the time period
where it is most urgently needed, namely during the
rush hour [45, 123].
5. Optimization often eliminates reduncancies in the sys-
tem and, thereby, increases the vulnerability to pertur-
bations, i.e. it decreases robustness and resilience.
6. Optimization tends to eliminate heterogeneity in the
system [80], while heterogeneity frequently supports
adaptability and resilience.
7. Optimization is often performed with centralized con-
cepts (e.g. by using supercomputers that process infor-
mation collected all over the system). Such centralized
systems are vulnerable to disturbances or failures of the
central control unit. They are also sensitive to informa-
tion overload, wrong selection of control parameters,
and delays in adaptive feedback control. In contrast, de-
centralized control (with a certain degree of autonomy
of local control units) may perform better, when the sys-
tem is complex and composed of many heterogeneous
elements, when the optimization problem is NP hard,
the degree of fluctuations is large, and predictability is
restricted to short time periods [77, 124]. Under such
conditions, decentralized control strategies can perform
well by adaptation to the actual local conditions, while
being robust to perturbations. Urban traffic light control
is a good example for this [121, 125].
8. Further on, today’s concept of quality control appears
to be awkward. It leads to a never-ending contest, re-
quiring people and organizations to fulfil permanently
increasing standards. This leads to over-emphasizing
measured performance criteria, while non-measured
success factors are neglected. The engagement into non-
rewarded activities is discouraged, and innovation may
be suppressed (e.g. when evaluating scientists by means
of their h-index, which requires them to focus on a big
research field that generates many citations in a short
time).
While so-called “beauty contests” are considered to
produce the best results, they will eventually absorb
more and more resources for this contest, while less
and less time remains for the work that is actually to
be performed, when the contest is won. Besides, a large
number of competitors have to waste considerable re-
sources for these contests which, of course, have to be
paid by someone. In this way, private and public sec-
tors (from physicians over hospitals, administrations,
up to schools and universities) are aching under the
evaluation-related administrative load, while little time
remains to perform the work that the corresponding ex-
perts have been trained for. It seems naı¨ve to believe
that this would not waste resources. Rather than making
use of individual strengths, which are highly heteroge-
neous, today’s way of evaluating performance enforces
a large degree of conformity.
There are also some problems with parameter fitting, a method
based on optimization as well. In this case, the goal func-
tion is typically an error function or a likelihood function.
Not only are calibration methods often “blindly” applied in
practice (by people who are not experts in statistics), which
can lead to overfitting (the fitting of meaningless “noise”), to
the neglection of collinearities (implying largely variable pa-
rameter values), or to inaccurate and problematic parameter
determinations (when the data set is insufficient in size, for
example, when large portfolios are to be optimized [126]).
As estimates for past data are not necessarily indicative for
the future, making predictions with interpolation approaches
9can be quite problematic (see also Sec. III C for the challenge
of time dependence). Moreover, classical calibration methods
do not reveal inappropriate model specifications (e.g. linear
ones, when non-linear models would be needed, or unsuitable
choices of model variables). Finally, they do not identify un-
known unknowns (i.e. relevant explanatory variables, which
have been overlooked in the modeling process).
H. Control approach
Managing economic systems is a particular challenge, not
only for the reasons discussed in the previous section. As large
economic systems belong to the class of complex systems,
they are hard or even impossible to manage with classical con-
trol approaches [76, 77].
Complex systems are characterized by a large number of
system elements (e.g. individuals, companies, countries, ...),
which have non-linear or network interactions causing mutual
dependencies and responses. Such systems tend to behave dy-
namic rather than static and probabilistic rather than determin-
istic. They usually show a rich, hardly predictable, and some-
times paradoxical system behavior. Therefore, they challenge
our way of thinking [127], and their controllability is often
overestimated (which is sometimes paraphrased as “illusion
of control”) [80, 128, 129]. In particular, causes and effects
are typically not proportional to each other, which makes it
difficult to predict the impact of a control attempt.
A complex system may be unresponsive to a control at-
tempt, or the latter may lead to unexpected, large changes in
the system behavior (so-called “phase transitions”, “regime
shifts”, or “catastrophes”) [75]. The unresponsiveness is
known as principle of Le Chatelier or Goodhart’s law [130],
according to which a complex system tends to counteract
external control attempts. However, regime shifts can occur,
when the system gets close to so-called “critical points” (also
known as “tipping points”). Examples are sudden changes
in public opinion (e.g. from pro to anti-war mood, from a
smoking tolerance to a public smoking ban, or from buy-
ing energy-hungry sport utilities vehicles (SUVs) to buying
environmentally-friendly cars).
Particularly in case of network interactions, big changes
may have small, no, or unexpected effects. Feedback loops,
unwanted side effects, and circuli vitiosi are quite typical. De-
lays may cause unstable system behavior (such as bull-whip
effects) [53], and over-critical perturbations can create cascad-
ing failures [78]. Systemic breakdowns (such as large-scale
blackouts, bankruptcy cascades, etc.) are often a result of such
domino or avalanche effects [77], and their probability of oc-
currence as well as their resulting damage are usually underes-
timated. Further examples are epidemic spreading phenomena
or disasters with an impact on the socio-economic system. A
more detailed discussion is given in Refs. [76, 77].
Other factors contributing to the difficulty to manage eco-
nomic systems are the large heterogeneity of system elements
and the considerable level of randomness as well as the possi-
bility of a chaotic or turbulent dynamics (see Sec. III D). Fur-
thermore, the agents in economic systems are responsive to
information, which can create self-fulfilling or self-destroying
prophecy effects. Inflation may be viewed as example of such
an effect. Interestingly, in some cases one even does not know
in advance, which of these effects will occur.
It is also not obvious that the control mechanisms are well
designed from a cybernetic perspective, i.e. that we have suf-
ficient information about the system and suitable control vari-
ables to make control feasible. For example, central banks
do not have terribly many options to influence the economic
system. Among them are performing open-market operations
(to control money supply), adjustments in fractional-reserve
banking (keeping only a limited deposit, while lending a large
part of the assets to others), or adaptations in the discount rate
(the interest rate charged to banks for borrowing short-term
funds directly from a central bank). Nevertheless, the central
banks are asked to meet multiple goals such as
• to guarantee well-functioning and robust financial mar-
kets,
• to support economic growth,
• to balance between inflation and unemployment,
• to keep exchange rates within reasonable limits.
Furthermore, the one-dimensional variable of “money” is also
used to influence individual behavior via taxes (by changing
behavioral incentives). It is questionable, whether money can
optimally meet all these goals at the same time (see Sec. III G).
We believe that a computer, good food, friendship, social sta-
tus, love, fairness, and knowledge can only to a certain extent
be replaced by and traded against each other. Probably for this
reason, social exchange comprises more than just material ex-
change [131–133].
It is conceivable that financial markets as well are trying to
meet too many goals at the same time. This includes
• to match supply and demand,
• to discover a fair price,
• to raise the foreign direct investment (FDI),
• to couple local economies with the international system,
• to facilitate large-scale investments,
• to boost development,
• to share risk,
• to support a robust economy, and
• to create opportunities (to gamble, to become rich, etc.).
Therefore, it would be worth stuyding the system from a cy-
bernetic control perspective. Maybe, it would work better to
separate some of these functions from each other rather than
mixing them.
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I. Human factors
Another aspect that tends to be overlooked in mainstream
economics is the relevance of psychological and social factors
such as emotions, creativity, social norms, herding effects, etc.
It would probably be wrong to interpret these effects just as a
result of perception biases (see Sec. III A). Most likely, these
human factors serve certain functions such as supporting the
creation of public goods [102] or collective intelligence [134,
135].
As Bruno Frey has pointed out, economics should be seen
from a social science perspective [136]. In particular, research
on happiness has revealed that there are more incentives than
just financial ones that motivate people to work hard [133]. In-
terestingly, there are quite a number of factors which promote
volunteering [132].
It would also be misleading to judge emotions from the per-
spective of irrational behavior. They are a quite universal and
a relatively energy-consuming way of signalling. Therefore,
they are probably more reliable than non-emotional signals.
Moreover, they create empathy and, consequently, stimulate
mutual support and a readiness for compromises. It is quite
likely that this creates a higher degree of cooperativeness in
social dilemma situations and, thereby, a higher payoff on av-
erage as compared to emotionless decisions, which often have
drawbacks later on.
J. Information
Finally, there is no good theory that would allow one to as-
sess the relevance of information in economic systems. Most
economic models do not consider information as an explana-
tory variable, although information is actually a stronger driv-
ing force of urban growth and social dynamics than energy
[137]. While we have an information theory to determine the
number of bits required to encode a message, we are lack-
ing a theory, which would allow us to assess what kind of
information is relevant or important, or what kind of infor-
mation will change the social or economic world, or history.
This may actually be largely dependent on the perception of
pieces of information, and on normative or moral issues fil-
tering or weighting information. Moreover, we lack theories
describing what will happen in cases of coincidence or con-
tradiction of several pieces of information. When pieces of
information interact, this can change their interpretation and,
thereby, the decisions and behaviors resulting from them. That
is one of the reasons why socio-economic systems are so hard
to predict: “Unknown unknowns”, structural instabilities, and
innovations cause emergent results and create a dynamics of
surprise [138].
IV. ROLE OF OTHER SCIENTIFIC FIELDS
A. Econophysics, ecology, computer science
The problems discussed in the previous two sections
pose interesting practical and fundamental challenges for
economists, but also other disciplines interested in under-
standing economic systems. Econophysics, for example, pur-
sues a physical approach to economic systems, applying meth-
ods from statistical physics [81], network theory [139, 140],
and the theory of complex systems [85, 87]. A contribution
of physics appears quite natural, in fact, not only because of
its tradition in detecting and modeling regularities in large
data sets [141]. Physics also has a lot of experience how to
theoretically deal with problems such as time-dependence,
fluctuations, friction, entropy, non-linearity, strong interac-
tions, correlations, heterogeneity, and many-particle simula-
tions (which can be easily extended towards multi-agent sim-
ulations). In fact, physics has influenced economic model-
ing already in the past. Macroeconomic models, for exam-
ple, were inspired by thermodynamics. More recent exam-
ples of relevant contributions by physicists concern models
of self-organizing conventions [54], of geographic agglomer-
ation [65], of innovation spreading [142], or of financial mar-
kets [143], to mention just a few examples.
One can probably say that physicists have been among
the pioneers calling for new approaches in economics [81,
87, 143–147]. A particularly visionary book beside Wolfgang
Weidlich’s work was the “Introduction to Quantitative As-
pects of Social Phenomena” by Elliott W. Montroll and Wade
W. Badger, which addressed by mathematical and empirical
analysis subjects as diverse as population dynamics, the arms
race, speculation patterns in stock markets, congestion in ve-
hicular traffic as well as the problems of atmospheric pollu-
tion, city growth and developing countries already in 1974
[148].
Unfortunately, it is impossible in our paper to reflect the
numerous contributions of the field of econophysics in any
adequate way. The richness of scientific contributions is prob-
ably reflected best by the Econophysics Forum run by Yi-
Cheng Zhang [149]. Many econophysics solutions are inter-
esting, but so far they are not broad and mighty enough to re-
place the rational agent paradigm with its large body of impli-
cations and applications. Nevertheless, considering the rela-
tively small number of econophysicists, there have been many
promising results. The probably largest fraction of publica-
tions in econophysics in the last years had a data-driven or
computer modeling approach to financial markets [143]. But
econophyics has more to offer than the analysis of financial
data (such as fluctuations in stock and foreign currency ex-
change markets), the creation of interaction models for stock
markets, or the development of risk management strategies.
Other scientists have focused on statistical laws underlying
income and wealth distributions, non-linear market dynamics,
macroeconomic production functions and conditions for eco-
nomic growth or agglomeration, sustainable economic sys-
tems, business cycles, microeconomic interaction models, net-
work models, the growth of companies, supply and produc-
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tion systems, logistic and transport networks, or innovation
dynamics and diffusion. An overview of subjects is given, for
example, by Ref. [152] and the contributions to annual spring
workshop of the Physics of Socio-Economic Systems Divi-
sion of the DPG [153].
To the dissatisfaction of many econophysicists, the transfer
of knowledge often did not work very well or, if so, has not
been well recognized [150]. Besides scepticism on the side
of many economists with regard to novel approaches intro-
duced by “outsiders”, the limited resonance and level of in-
terdisciplinary exchange in the past was also caused in part
by econophysicists. In many cases, questions have been an-
swered, which no economist asked, rather than addressing
puzzles economists are interested in. Apart from this, the
econophysics work was not always presented in a way that
linked it to the traditions of economics and pointed out defi-
ciencies of existing models, highlighting the relevance of the
new approach well. Typical responses are: Why has this model
been proposed and not another one? Why has this simplifica-
tion been used (e.g. an Ising model of interacting spins rather
than a rational agent model)? Why are existing models not
good enough to describe the same facts? What is the relevance
of the work compared to previous publications? What practi-
cal implications does the finding have? What kind of paradigm
shift does the approach imply? Can existing models be mod-
ified or extended in a way that solves the problem without
requiring a paradigm shift? Correspondingly, there have been
criticisms not only by mainstream economists, but also by col-
leagues, who are open to new approaches [151].
Therefore, we would like to suggest to study the vari-
ous economic subjects from the perspective of the above-
mentioned fundamental challenges, and to contrast econo-
physics models with traditional economic models, showing
that the latter leave out important features. It is important
to demonstrate what properties of economic systems can-
not be understood for fundamental reasons within the main-
stream framework (i.e. cannot be dealt with by additional
terms within the modeling class that is conventionally used).
In other words, one needs to show why a paradigm shift is un-
avoidable, and this requires careful argumentation. We are not
claiming that this has not been done in the past, but it certainly
takes an additional effort to explain the essence of the econo-
physics approach in the language of economics, particularly
as mainstream economics may not always provide suitable
terms and frameworks to do this. This is particularly impor-
tant, as the number of econophysicists is small compared to
the number of economists, i.e. a minority wants to convince
an established majority. To be taken seriously, one must also
demonstrate a solid knowledge of related previous work of
economists, to prevent the stereotypical reaction that the sub-
ject of the paper has been studied already long time ago (tac-
itly implying that it does not require another paper or model
to address what has already been looked at before).
A reasonable and promising strategy to address the above
fundamental and practical challenges is to set up multi-
disciplinary collaborations in order to combine the best of all
relevant scientific methods and knowledge. It seems plausible
that this will generate better models and higher impact than
working in separation, and it will stimulate scientific innova-
tion. Physicists can contribute with their experience in han-
dling large data sets, in creating and simulating mathematical
models, in developing useful approximations, in setting up
laboratory experiments and measurement concepts. Current
research activities in economics do not seem to put enough
focus on
• modeling approaches for complex systems [154],
• computational modeling of what is not analytically
tractable anymore, e.g. by agent-based models [155–
157],
• testable predictions and their empirical or experimental
validation [164],
• managing complexity and systems engineering ap-
proaches to identify alternative ways of organizing fi-
nancial markets and economic systems [91, 93, 165],
and
• an advance testing of the effectiveness, efficiency,
safety, and systemic impact (side effects) of innova-
tions, before they are implemented in economic sys-
tems. This is in sharp contrast to mechanical, electrical,
nuclear, chemical and medical drug engineering, for ex-
ample.
Expanding the scope of economic thinking and paying more
attention to these natural, computer and engineering science
aspects will certainly help to address the theoretical and prac-
tical challenges posed by economic systems. Besides physics,
we anticipate that also evolutionary biology, ecology, psy-
chology, neuroscience, and artificial intelligence will be able
to make significant contributions to the understanding of the
roots of economic problems and how to solve them. In con-
clusion, there are interesting scientific times ahead.
B. Social Sciences
It is a good question, whether answering the above list of
fundamental challenges will sooner or later solve the practical
problems as well. We think, this is a precondition, but it takes
more, namely the consideration of social factors. In particular,
the following questions need to be answered:
1. How to understand human decision-making? How to
explain deviations from rational choice theory and the
decision-theoretical paradoxes? Why are people risk
averse?
2. How does consciousness and self-consciousness come
about?
3. How to understand creativity and innovation?
4. How to explain homophily, i.e. the fact that individuals
tend to agglomerate, interact with and imitate similar
others?
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5. How to explain social influence, collective decision
making, opinion dynamics and voting behavior?
6. Why do individuals often cooperate in social dilemma
situations?
7. How do indirect reciprocity, trust and reputation
evolve?
8. How do costly punishment, antisocial punishment, and
discrimination come about?
9. How can the formation of social norms and conven-
tions, social roles and socialization, conformity and in-
tegration be understood?
10. How do language and culture evolve?
11. How to comprehend the formation of group identity and
group dynamics? What are the laws of coalition forma-
tion, crowd behavior, and social movements?
12. How to understand social networks, social structure,
stratification, organizations and institutions?
13. How do social differentiation, specialization, inequality
and segregation come about?
14. How to model deviance and crime, conflicts, violence,
and wars?
15. How to understand social exchange, trading, and market
dynamics?
We think that, despite the large amount of research performed
on these subjects, they are still not fully understood. The
ultimate goal would be to formulate mathematical models,
which would allow one to understand these issues as emer-
gent phenomena based on first principles, e.g. as a result of
(co-)evolutionary processes. Such first principles would be the
basic facts of human capabilities and the kinds of interactions
resulting from them, namely
1. birth, death, and reproduction,
2. the need of and competition for resources (such as food
and water),
3. the ability to observe their environment (with different
senses),
4. the capability to memorize, learn, and imitate,
5. empathy and emotions,
6. signaling and communication abilities,
7. constructive (e.g. tool-making) and destructive (e.g.
fighting) abilities,
8. mobility and (limited) carrying capacity,
9. the possibility of social and economic exchange.
Such features can, in principle, be implemented in agent-
based models [158–163]. Computer simulations of many in-
teracting agents would allow one to study the phenomena
emerging in the resulting (artificial or) model societies, and to
compare them with stylized facts [163, 168, 169]. The main
challenge, however, is not to program a seemingly realistic
computer game. We are looking for scientific models, i.e. the
underlying assumptions need to be validated, and this requires
to link computer simulations with empirical and experimen-
tal research [170], and with massive (but privacy-respecting)
mining of social interaction data [141]. In the ideal case, there
would also be an analytical understanding in the end, as it has
been recently gained for interactive driver behavior [111].
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